

Grizzly Man and the Spiritual Life

Patrick Curry

(A draft of a paper for the *Journal for the Study of Religion, Culture and Nature* 43:3 (2010) pp. 206-219)

Abstract

The story of Timothy Treadwell, as portrayed in Werner Herzog's film (2005), provides a basis for a critique of two opposing attitudes and programmes which can be identified, in broad metaphysical terms, as spiritual idealism and scientific materialism. I criticize the former, inferring from Treadwell's fate the danger – for spiritual seekers, directly, and for scholars, indirectly – of trying to be-at-one or achieve absolute unity with the beloved. I then recommend a radical but viable middle way, grounded in our embodied, imperfect, unstable, liminal nature – a view clearly evident in aboriginal and folk wisdom traditions but also articulated by philosophers including Merleau-Ponty, Plumwood, Abram, Snyder and Bateson.

Timothy Treadwell is best known to most people from 'Grizzly Man', a documentary made by Werner Herzog in 2005. Treadwell lived with wild Alaskan grizzly bears (*Ursus arctos horribilis*) for thirteen summers before he and his girlfriend, Amie Huguenard, were killed and eaten by one in 2003. Herzog's movie incorporates some of the many hours of footage recorded by Treadwell which clearly show that what he did, however inadvisable, was remarkable.¹ My concern here, however, is neither with Treadwell himself nor with the movie, but rather with the implications of this tragic story both for scholars of religion, culture and nature and for spiritual seekers seeking to navigate those deep waters.

Watching the film, one is immediately alerted to the existence of a possible problem by Treadwell's attitude to the bears: his intense sentimentality, his self-mythologisation, and his issues, so to speak, with boundaries. 'I'm in love with my animal friends. I'm in love with my animal friends! In love with my animal friends. I'm very, very troubled. It's very emotional.' And that emotion is wrapped up in a cause, which he defines as 'struggling against civilization itself.'

It struck me, listening to Treadwell, that such crusading sentimentality was covertly but intimately connected with the casual brutality of the bears' enemies – sadodispassionate, to use Teresa Brennan's apt term (1993) – against whom Treadwell was reacting: the hunters, poachers, and to some extent, wildlife service managers. Herzog too is ideologically close to that party, if more than usually articulate, and his voice is unmistakably anthropocentric:

what haunts me is that in all the faces of all the bears that Treadwell ever filmed, I discover no kinship, no understanding, no mercy. I see only the overwhelming indifference of nature. To me, there is no such thing as a secret world of the bears. And this blank stare speaks only of a half-bored interest in food. But for Timothy Treadwell, this bear was a friend, a saviour.

Treadwell thus prizes non-human 'animals' living in 'wilderness' over all human 'civilisation', and Herzog takes the opposite position. But this polarisation disguises what is shared

¹ The film is easily available, and there are many sources on the internet. In addition to basic information, two interesting commentaries are those by wild bear expert Charlie Russell (<http://cloudline.org/treadwell.html>) and John Rogers (<http://www.katmaibears.com/timothytreadwell.htm>), both accessed 14 September 2009. Quotations herein by Treadwell, Herzog and Sven Haakanson are taken from the film.

by both parties: a foundational distinction between ‘nature’ and ‘humanity’, enabling the tendentially absolute valorisation of one over the other. I cannot delve here into the Platonic-Christian-Cartesian provenance of this dogma – almost certainly the single most destructive discourse ever to have appeared in this beautiful but benighted world. Although many analysts could be mentioned in this connection, some of whom I discuss below, the late Val Plumwood (1993, 2002) remains perhaps the most acute. (See also Curry 2003, 2007 and 2008.) The point is that although the sentimentalists like Treadwell do much less immediate harm than the brutalists, both relate to ‘nature’ in ways with destructive effects (sometimes lethal, although much more often for the bears than for humans) on all concerned. Both are dead ends.

The most sensible statement in the film was made by the Native American curator of the Alutig Museum, Sven Haakanson, who observed that Treadwell

tried to *be* a bear.... For us on the island you don't do that. You don't invade their territory.... For me, it was the ultimate in disrespecting the bear and what the bear represents.... If I look at it from my culture, Timothy Treadwell crossed a boundary that we have lived with for 7000 years.

In striking contrast to the views of both Treadwell and Herzog (but nearly inaudible, thanks to their louder voices), here is the basis for a viable middle way, one which refuses both poles and offers a way to *live with* the Other(s). It is a kind of wisdom deeply rooted in the world’s remaining, relatively intact indigenous cultures. In this respect, critiques of ‘the ecological Indian’ as simply another instance of the Myth of the Noble Savage function as a rear-guard defense of anti-ecological modernism; they should not be allowed to obscure the extent to which our survival depends on collectively rediscovering how to live “with the Earth on the Earth’s terms” (Kane 1998: 14; see also Snyder 1990, Deloria 2000 and Plumwood 2002: 218-35).

Haakanson’s verdict is of a piece with one of the sacred stories of the Sweet Grass Cree, wherein a young hunter met and began living with a strange young woman who eventually took him to meet her people:

When he had been there a long time, and spring had come, then he knew that she, the woman, as it seemed to him, whom he had to wife, was a bear, and that also the old man and the old woman were bears. And he was sorry that he could not always be with them (Bloomfield 1993: 61).²

Or as the poet Robert Bringhurst (2009: 235) puts it, in a poem about ursine-human relations, ‘You can have what you want but can’t have it for long.’

Gary Snyder’s words, written well before Treadwell’s death, are also apropos: reconnecting with the wild, he says, ‘requires embracing the other as oneself and stepping across the line – not “becoming one” or mixing things up but holding the sameness *and* difference delicately in mind.’ Even more pointedly, he advises: ‘do not be too hasty in setting out to “become one with”’ (1990: 192, 120).³

Western traditions of folk and fairy-tales with premodern roots teach the same lesson: you may, exceptionally, be able to visit Faërie but you cannot, as a human being, *stay* there; and it is dangerous to try. (See Tolkien 2005 and Flieger and Anderson 2008). Thinking of Treadwell, I am also reminded of W.H. Auden’s (1970: 149) apposite warning:

² With thanks to Mark Dickinson for drawing this story to my attention and kindly supplying a copy.

³ See also pp. 166-86 on “The Woman Who Married a Bear”.

All folk tales recognize that there are false enchantments as well as true ones. When we are truly enchanted we desire nothing for ourselves, only that the enchanting object or person shall continue to exist. When we are falsely enchanted, we desire either to possess the enchanting being or be possessed by it.

Spiritual Cultures of Death

Taking Treadwell and his opponents as exemplars of materialist difference and idealist unity respectively, I am going to recommend a radical middle way between these two poles. As Bateson (1987: 51-2) remarked towards the end of his life, however, the problem as a whole

is not entirely symmetrical. . . . while I disbelieve almost everything that is believed by the counter-culture, I find it more comfortable to live with that disbelief than with the dehumanizing disgust and horror that conventional occidental themes and ways of life inspire in me.

These themes lie at the heart of what Lewis Mumford (1967, 1970) called ‘the megamachine’, cogently describing its ecocidal effects. Consequently, it is their apologists – the programmatic modernists, dogmatic secularists and acolytes of scientism, together with the ranks of career bureaucrats, managers and administrators responsible for institutional dissemination – who should principally be held to account for those effects.

The apparent contrast with the metaphysical idealism of the counterpole is highly misleading, however. So too, potentially, is the ‘spiritual’ dimension to a radical middle way I am recommending. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the heavy weight of religious traditions whose adherents have also enlisted in the ongoing war on the body, the feminine, and the Earth. Plumwood (1992) has brilliantly diagnosed the poison, ‘rotten with perfection’, to borrow Kenneth Burke’s excellent apophthegm (1966: 16), at the heart of Platonism. (See also Lloyd 1984 and Cavarero 1995.) Another taproot is the discourse that may be very broadly called ‘Gnostic’, enormously influential both within and outside Christianity, which embodies in various ways a common fear and contempt of the body, the feminine, the Earth, and ‘darkness’, all of which salvation requires the devotee to transcend and escape or negate as quickly and thoroughly as possible. As Montaigne, with characteristic sanity, observed of Christian martyrs suffering bodily torture with equanimity: ‘we have to admit that there is some change for the worse in their souls, some frenzy, no matter how holy’ (1991: 390). Yet in Christianity, this tendency coexists with the potentially grounding implications of the Incarnation (*kenosis*) and a spiritual practice centred on one’s ongoing *relationship* with God.

But this is not only a ‘Western’ problem. For Advaita Vedanta too, the material world (regarded – no surprise – as feminine) is a deception and illusion, like ‘dog vomit to be cast out in disgust by the discriminating knower.’ Similarly, Jains are encouraged to achieve a mystical state to the same world-denying end. (See the excellent discussion in Jain and Kirpal 2009.) The same ascetic metaphysic and ethos are to be found in Buddhism as well, affirmations of the Middle Way, and of nirvana *as* samsara (to quote the Heart Sutra) notwithstanding. As Snyder (1990: 196) has remarked, that ‘Otherworldly philosophies end up doing more damage to the planet (and human psyches) than the pain and suffering that is in the existential conditions they seek to transcend.’ Ultimately, however, the tension between world-denying spiritual absolutism and what I have called a radical middle way runs not so much between the major religions as through all of them.

Nor can this issue be evaded as merely historical or foreign exoticism. The most influential New Age philosophy today is probably Ken Wilbur’s grand neo-Hegelian synthesis, which is saturated with a Gnostic, evolutionary, hierarchical and anthropocentric drive to realise ‘Cosmic

Consciousness'. What, then, could be less surprising than to find that Wilbur denigrates relational, ecological and feminist spiritualities as inferior? (For a critical antidote, see Ferrer 2002.) And a great deal of this pernicious sort of ideology has found its way into systems of esotericism and occultism, both old and new, whose 'spirituality' belies their underlying concern: personal power and 'spiritual' ambition. As Byron observed, 'when a man talks of system, his case is hopeless'; whether that system is occult or exoteric, spiritual or material, overtly metaphysical or scientific, is secondary. (There is no room to develop the point here, but power is the top priority of the magic which both historically and philosophically fed directly into the formation of modern materialist science; see Curry 2010.)

Middle Way Metaphysics

The two polarised extremes in the story of 'Grizzly Man' can be assimilated without significant metaphysical loss to the millenia-long struggle between idealism and materialism. Many authors have usefully identified these poles in various ways: 'spiritual idealism' vs. 'scientific determinism' (David Abram), 'unity' vs. 'hyperseparation' (Val Plumwood), 'the rational' vs. 'the sensible' (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), 'supernaturalism' vs. 'mechanism' (Gregory Bateson), 'naïve unity' vs. 'reductionism' (Paul Ricoeur), and 'the lyric' vs. 'the technological' (Jan Zwicky). I shall go deeper into some of these discussions in what follows. But I refrain from any critique of the polemics of Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and similar current representatives of scientific materialism. There is good reason to suspect them, but John Gray (2008), Mary Midgley (1992, 2001) and Terry Eagleton (2006, 2009) have already exposed the New Atheists' theological ignorance, philosophical shallowness and crypto-religiosity (and therefore hypocrisy). Another consideration is simply that of space. I want to concentrate here on the 'spiritual' pole.

In this context, what 'Grizzly Man' conveys is that spiritual unity or Oneness is not a viable or helpful corrective to the icy objectification of 'nature', nor to materialists' attempts to reduce subjectivity to that pole. The kind of romantic move for which Treadwell serves well as an exemplar is rather a counter-reductionism which is ultimately equally counterproductive. Why? Because it too corroborates and legitimates the metaphysical split that is at the very root of the problem. As Bateson put it, 'These two species of superstition, these rival epistemologies, the supernatural and the mechanical, feed each other' (1987: 51). More recently, regarding scientific discourse (privileging abstract objectivity) and New Age discourse (privileging subjectivity), David Abram has pointed out that

by prioritizing one or the other, both of these views perpetuate the distinction between human 'subjects' and natural 'objects,' and hence neither threatens the common conception of sensible nature as a purely passive dimension suitable for human manipulation and use. While both of these views are unstable, each bolsters the other; by bouncing from one to the other – from scientific determinism to spiritual idealism and back again – contemporary discourse easily avoids the possibility that both the perceiving being and the perceived being are of the same stuff, that the perceiver and the perceived are interdependent and in some sense even reversible aspects of a common animate nature, or Flesh, that is *at once both sensible and sensitive* (1996: 66-67; emphasis in original).

I would only add that the sentimental yearning for unity, implied in what Abram terms 'spiritual idealism', lends itself very well to ideological exploitation by ruthlessly instrumental capital, e.g. sentimental ditties about how we are all One, sung with a tear in the eye by various world-eaters, big and small, before going back to work.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy contributes profoundly to an understanding of these issues. He used the term 'Flesh' to denote a metaphysics that uncompromisingly refuses to be corralled into either the subjectivist or the objectivist camp. It describes a chiasmic criss-crossing whereby 'subject' and 'object', 'body' and 'mind', 'self' and 'world', and 'inner' and 'outer' are never reducible to each other, but nor are they possible without each other. Each pole not only entails the other but enables, indeed *requires*, the other; yet each also *limits* the other, preventing pure realization in either direction. This relational pluralism means that neither identity or unity, nor alterity or hyperseparation, can ever be attained in any pure or permanent way: 'what enables us to center our existence is what also prevents us from centering it completely...' (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 85; and see his 1968). It follows, I think, that any attempt to achieve a monist purity (in either direction) is ill-advised at best, and tragic at worst.

Graham Harvey's (2006) study of animism, combining insights from religious studies, anthropology and philosophy, is grounded in the same tensive and liminal but hopeful place. Similarly, Jan Zwicky's 'domestic', where we actually live, mediates 'the essential tension' between lyric desire (unachievable but unavoidable) on the one hand and the otherwise destructive instrumental capacity for technology on the other (1992: 258).⁴

Plumwood's Contribution

Val Plumwood has contributed at least three important related perspectives in this context. First, she has emphasised that the

oppositional formulation of spirit versus matter renders invisible the important concept of a materialist spirituality which does not invoke a separate spirit as an extra, independent individualized ingredient but rather posits a richer, fully intentional non-reductionist concept of the earthly and the material (2002: 222).

And the same work is not only a critique of value-laden hierarchical dualism but an articulation of a 'materialist spirituality' or 'dialogical materiality' which converges, from an ecofeminist direction, with Merleau-Ponty's understanding of lived bodies.

Plumwood has also argued for a 'relational self' as against both 'radical exclusion' – a conception of the self as self-contained and the other as wholly alien – and 'incorporation', which denies difference and treats the other as a form of the same or self: precisely Treadwell's mode. Against that – in an exact but independent echo of both Haakanson and Snyder – she urged the need for 'recognising kinship *and* recognising difference' (1993: 155). *Kinship*, note, not identity – again, the same theme so often found in aboriginal and indigenous contexts.

Finally but not least, Plumwood mounted a cogent critique of the weakest and most problematic part of Deep Ecology in the form favoured by Arne Naess et al., so-called Ecosophy T: the spiritual quest for 'Self-realization'. There are more things wrong about this idea than can be discussed in detail here (see Curry 2006: 71-81). One is particularly relevant in this context, however: the quest for a meta-identity subsuming humanity, nature and (in effect) God in an inflated, quasi-Hegelian 'Big Self'. All the problematics I have already identified attend any such attempt. That includes two also identified by Plumwood (1991, 2000): not only the way Ecosophy T invites mere egoism writ large, but the way it facilitates a distinctly New Age capital-friendly

⁴ By the way, the contrast between these philosophies and Heidegger's inflated and reductive *Dasein*, with its anthropocentric valorisation of human language and eschatological conception of history – all too perversely realised in his time – is surely striking. (See Westling 2007.)

program when commodification itself is integral to the problem. As Leonard Cohen wryly sang, “I bite my lip/ I buy what I’m told/ From the latest hit/ To the wisdom of old.”⁵

What Can We Learn?

In the end, at the risk of sounding callous, it seems to me that the fatal bear called Treadwell’s bluff, so to speak: ‘You want unity? Ok...’⁶ This risk is worth taking because there is a serious point at stake here: Treadwell, in a sense, succeeded. He did, literally, become one with a bear, although he was no longer there to appreciate the fact. But I shall assume this was not an outcome he really wanted, or one that most of us would want. More complexly, I am suggesting that that outcome was fundamentally a consequence not of his chosen object of desire (a bear) but of his *mode*. As Ames and Hall [2003: 42] remark in their recent commentary on the *Daodejing*, ‘The Daoist problem with desire does not concern what is desired, but rather the manner of the desiring.’

I have argued a largely negative case that the quest for unity is a mistake because it is humanly impossible; so the attempt, being doomed to failure, is destructive and self-destructive. In a word, we are relational – and *a fortiori*, ecological – beings. The same argument can be made in more positive terms, however. Borrowing the words of Jessica Benjamin (1985: 47; emphasis in original), also quoted by Plumwood (1993: 156),

Experiences of ‘being with’ are predicated on a continually evolving awareness of difference, on a sense of intimacy felt as occurring between ‘the *two* of us’. The fact that self and other are not merged is precisely what makes experience of merging have such high emotional impact.

This point is not as paradoxical as it may sound. If self and other are *merged*, there is no longer a self (to experience) nor an other (to be experienced); hence there can be no *merging* (intimacy, closeness, wonder, etc.).

In short, acting out the desire to attain perfect unity or become one with, to be dissolved in or taken up into, to realise a state of perfect or complete or permanent union with *anything*, partakes of an attitude which is profoundly nonrelational and, as such, unecological. Furthermore, metaphorically speaking (and none the less truthfully for that), the actor runs a serious risk of being killed and eaten, in a process doubly destructive: both suicidal, because you will cease to exist as such, and homicidal, because so too will the beloved cease to exist for you. This is the case, I suggest, whether the beloved is another human being, a nonhuman animal, a god, God, the Godhead, Being or the Absolute. Those for whom the latter spiritual entities are meaningless need not accompany the argument so far, of course. But those to whom they are realities should remember that even in such a context, they themselves remain embodied relational beings; in which case, the danger, albeit metaphysical, still stands.

Why should this be the case? Because as articulated by the philosophers I have just quoted, we are creatures of that living, imperfect, changeable, dynamic middle, somewhere between and

⁵ From *Ten New Songs* (2001).

⁶ I’m aware of a certain lack of charity in my attitude to Treadwell, probably because I’m a recovering romantic One-ist with sentimental tendencies myself. As a friend remarked, he was an innocent, and terrible things often happen to innocents. So that is a failing on my part; but I don’t think it changes my main point. I note too (as pointed out to me by Mark Dickinson) that Treadwell probably stood a better chance among the bears than among his own people; and that he was also, in part, a victim of sheer bad luck. Nor is it negligible (as Bron Taylor reminded me) that he had more than a decade of a richly meaningful and satisfying life with bears and, for all we know, they with him.

different from any two genuine polarities that can be named. Any attempt to fully realise (make real) either pole can therefore only ‘succeed’ by failing, so to speak, while potentially wreaking personal and collective havoc along the way.

The middle way here is the radical equality of ‘emptiness’: as embodied beings (of whatever kind, and however embodied) we are all in the same existential situation and therefore share profound affinities. These mean we can all potentially empathize with and perhaps help each other; but that situation includes our respective boundaries, whose relative reality should be acknowledged and respected. It does *not* mean that we are all ‘the same’.

Nor, appropriately, is this understanding a single perspective. It is where many cross but also remain distinct: in terms of the authors I have just quoted, ecological phenomenology (Abram, incorporating Merleau-Ponty), philosophical animism (Plumwood and Harvey) but also Buddhism (Mahayana, especially Madhyamika) – arguably meeting in Snyder’s Buddhist animism (Taylor 2005: 1563 and see Taylor 2009: 17-18) – as well as philosophical Daoism, Heraclitus’s *panta rhei*, Buber’s I-Thou philosophy and Hillman’s metapsychology of ‘soul’, not to mention perspectivism itself (see Viveiros de Castro 2004 and Curry 2003 and 2008). This is a rich array, to be sure; but the reader should keep it in perspective, too. These views comprise a distinctly marginal and counter-hegemonic minority seen against the overwhelming historical dominance, at least in the ‘West’ but increasingly globally, of those ‘two vying “monisms”’ (Jonas 1982: 16), transcendental spiritualism and scientific materialism.

Having already conceded that adherents of the latter are globally more powerful and more destructive, I would nonetheless like to sound a warning to those tempted by the path of spiritual union as ‘the answer’. Not only is it anti-ecological but insofar as self (spirit, etc.) and world (body, etc.) are, in lived practice, inseparable, then to try to ‘transcend’ the latter is an act of self-mutilation and potentially suicide. That, I believe, is the import of ‘Grizzly Man’ and Timothy Treadwell’s best legacy.

REFERENCES

Abram, David. 1996. *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World* (New York: Vintage Books).

Auden, W.H. 1970. *A Certain World: A Commonplace Book* (New York: The Viking Press).

Bateson, Gregory and Mary Catherine. 1987. *Angels Fear: An Investigation into the Nature and Meaning of the Sacred* (London: Rider).

Benjamin, Jessica. 1985. ‘The Bonds of Love: Rational Violence and Erotic Domination’, in Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine (eds.), *The Future of Difference* (New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press).

Bloomfield, Leonard (ed.). 1993. *Sacred Stories of the Sweet Grass Cree* (Saskatoon: Thistledown Books).

Brenna, Teresa. 1993. *History after Lacan* (London: Routledge).

Bringhurst, Robert. 2009. *Selected Poems* (Kentville: Gaspereau Press).

- Burke, Kenneth. 1966. *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method* (Berkeley: University of California).
- Cavarero, Adriana. 1995. *In Spite of Plato: A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy*, transl. Serena Anderlini-D'Onofrio and Aine O'Healy (New York: New York).
- Curry, Patrick. 2003. 'Re-Thinking Nature: Towards an Eco-Pluralism', *Environmental Values* 12.3: 337-360.
- Curry, Patrick. 2006. *Ecological Ethics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- Curry, Patrick. 2007. 'Post-Secular Nature: Principles and Politics', *Worldviews: Environment, Culture, Religion* 11.3: 284-304.
- Curry, Patrick. 2008. 'Nature Post-Nature', *New Formations* 26: 51-64.
- Curry, Patrick. 2010. 'Enchantment and Modernity', in Tom Crook and Mathew Feldman (eds.), *Sacred Modernities: Rethinking Modernity in a Post-Secular Age* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Daodejing: 'Making This Life Significant': A Philosophical Translation*, ed. and transl. Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall. 2003. (New York: Ballantine Books).
- Deloria Jr., Vine. 2000. 'The Speculations of Krech', *Worldviews* 4.3: 283-93.
- Eagleton, Terry. 2006. "Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching", *London Review of Books* (19.10.06).
- Eagleton, Terry. 2009. *Reason, Faith and Revolution: Reflections on the God Debate* (Yale University Press).
- Ferrer, Jorge N. 2002. *Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality* (Albany: SUNY Press).
- Flieger, Verlyn and Douglas A. Anderson (eds.). 2008. *Tolkien on Fairy-Stories* (London: HarperCollins).
- Gray, John. 2008. 'The Atheist Delusion', *The Guardian* (14.3.08).
- Harvey, Graham. 2006. *Animism: Respecting the Living World* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Jain, Andrea R. and Jeffrey J. Kirpal. 2009. 'Quietism and Karma: Non-Action as Non-Ethics in Jain Asceticism', *Common Knowledge* 15.2: 197-208.
- Jonas, Hans. 1982. *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Kane, Sean. 1998. *Wisdom of the Myhtellers*, 2nd edn. (Peterborough: Broadview Press).

- Lloyd, Genevieve. 1984. *The Man of Reason* (London: Methuen).
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. *The Phenomenology of Perception*, transl. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, transl. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press).
- Midgley, Mary. 1992. *Science and Salvation* (London: Routledge).
- Midgley, Mary. 2001. *Science and Poetry* (London: Routledge).
- Montaigne, Michel de. 1991. *The Complete Essays*, transl. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin).
- Mumford, Lewis. 1967, 1970. *The Myth of the Machine*, 2 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace Javonovitch).
- Plumwood, Val. 1993. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (London: Routledge).
- Plumwood, Val. 1991. 'Nature, Self and Gender: Feminsim, Environmental Philosophy and the Critique of Rationalism', *Hypatia* 6: 10-16, 23-26.
- Plumwood, Val. 2000. 'Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems: A Feminist Ecosocialist Analysis', in Eric Katz, Andrew Light, and David Rothenberg (eds.), *Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in Deep Ecology* (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 59-84.
- Plumwood, Val. 2002. *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason* (London: Routledge).
- Snyder, Gary. 1990. *The Practice of the Wild* (Berkeley: Counterpoint).
- Taylor, Bron (ed.). 2005. *The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature*, 2 vols. (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum).
- Taylor, Bron. 2009. *Dark Green Religion: Nature Spirituality and the Planetary Future* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Tolkien, J.R.R. 2005. *Smith of Wootton Major*, ed. Verlyn Flieger (London: HarperCollins).
- Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2004. "Exchanging Perspectives: The Transformation of Objects into Subjects in Amerindian Ontologies", *Common Knowledge* 10,3: 463-84.
- Westling, Louise. 2007. 'Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: Eco-poetics and the Problem of Humanism', in Fiona Beckett and Terry Gifford (eds.), *Culture, Creativity and Environment: New Environmental Criticism* (Amsterdam: Rodopi).
- Zwicky, Jan. 1992. *Lyric Philosophy* (University of Toronto Press).